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JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-22(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ...,
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]"2

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Appellant has listed what it terms to be the issues presented for review, the
issues before the Court were framed by the Supreme Court itself. In an Order dated August
29, 2005, the Supreme Court limited the issue before it to the following:
1.

"Whether the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the standard governing

a motion to disqualify under rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by weighing the
hardship to the client against the prejudice suffered by the opposing party." Sp. Ct. Order,
ibid.
Although this is stated by Appellants in their brief as the issue, they stray from this
limited issue into other side-issues in their brief. To the extent they stray from this single
issue, their Opening Brief should be stricken.

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5.

2

Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended).
1

"Where courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual disputes, and the quantity
of less tangible factors implicating the trial court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally
in a better position to consider and weigh all those circumstances in their application of the
legal standard at issue.? Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998)
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-56 (Utah 1994)). The trial court's ruling
incorporates both questions of fact and law, and thus we apply an abuse of discretion
standard. See Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1995) (where the trial
court's findings involve "mixed questions of fact and law ... The proper standard of review
.. . is the abuse of discretion standard").
Defendant argues that the standard of review should be a de novo review, however,
it is asking the Court to review the "balancing", (or from Defendant's point of view, the
alleged lack of balancing), that is required by Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct. The very balancing Defendant seeks to review, requires a review of the factual
circumstances of the case as well as the application of the law. Therefore, the abuse of
discretion standard is more properly applied in this appeal.
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL
Rule 3.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. That rules states:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
2

(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial
hardship on the client.
b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from
doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
SunCrest appeals the Court of Appeals' affirmation of a decision made by Judge
Lynn Davis in the Fourth District Court in Provo, in a case that has been litigated now for
nearly five years and which continues to be before the Fourth District Court. Currently,
Judge Derek Pullan presides in that matter. Judge Pullan recently indicated that the size of
the file had grown to 18 volumes and reaches over four feet in height. Trial is tentatively
scheduled to proceed in January of the upcoming year, less than two months away.
Although, in fairness, it is likely to be continued to some later date.
The decision of Judge Davis was to deny Westbrook's (who have recently changed
their name to SunCrest) request that DJI's counsel, Mr. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. be
disqualified as counsel although they allege he is a "necessary witness." As explained by
Judge Davis, not only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, even if he were, the exceptions
in Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility apply in this case. (R. 2454-2446).
DJI initiated this action in May of 2001. (R. 2453). After almost three years of
litigation, Westbrook filed a tactical motion to disqualify DJFs counsel. It was not meant
to advance this matter, rather it was an attempt to delay, an approach Westbrook has
3

continually employed in this matter. This step is no different. All of the tactical delay is
meant to capitalize upon the duration of time they, as developers, can keep Plaintiff's
property from being developed through this litigation.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
On November 16,2000, the parties entered into an agreement. See R. 2453. On May
7, 2001, now more than 4 years ago, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of that agreement and
began this litigation. Id., see also R. 162-1. After considerable discovery, on December 20,
2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it is abundantly clear Plaintiff
sought recovery for material misrepresentations made by Defendants in negotiating the
agreement. Id., see also R. 1058-951. On January 28,2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition
to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 56(f) continuance. Id., see
also R. 1153-1082. The Court granted them additional months of discovery before they
were required to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
After eight additional months of discovery, on August 7, 2003, Westbrook filed its
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 1676-1356. On
August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 1926-1693. On August 27, 2003,
the lower Court heard arguments on D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see
also R.1927. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the
parties'agreement. R. 2452, 2001-1996.
4

On February 19,2004, 3 Vi years after the agreement was signed, 3 years after the suit
was initiated, more than a year after Plaintiff had filed it's summary judgment motion, 6
months after Westbrook had filed it's own reply, 6 months after the Court heard arguments
on the motion, and more than 3 months after the Court made it's decision on the motion,
Westbrook moved to disqualify Mr. Snuffer. R. 2452. That motion was denied by the lower
Court. R. 2454-2446. Westbrook sought an interlocutory appeal of that denial. R. 2484.
The Appeals Court affirmed Judge Davis' decision (see Exhibit A), and this Court has now
granted certiorari to review both of those Court's decisions.
Throughout Defendants have argued Mr. Snuffer is a necessary witness as was their
own counsel, Baird & Jones. However, discovery of Baird & Jones' information and
materials have been resisted throughout the course of the proceedings below, and they have
not produced a single document nor answered a single question. Consistently they have
repulsed any discovery regarding their files or information. Baird's files were withheld
because of a claimed "privilege" and Judge Pullan sustained that objection. SunCrest then
designated Bruce Baird as their 30(b)(6) witness, even though he departed Phoenix before
the final agreement was settled and signed in Phoenix. This designation of Baird was again
a ploy. Even when DJ Investments wanted to ask questions about correspondence between
Baird and Micron prior to any lawsuit being filed (there is a case between Micron and
SunCrest) it was Baird's position that such materials were undiscoverable and privileged.
When it was challenged, Judge Pullan upheld the claim of privilege and so Mr. Baird's
materials have also been undiscoverable.
5

Facts established in the Record below:
In Westbrook's prior motion, before the Court of Appeals, and in their current brief,
Westbrook relies upon deposition testimony of Dave Mast, Robert Christiansen, and Jeff
Anderson as support for their allegation that Mr. Snuffer will become a necessary witness.
As was shown in the record below, the testimony used by Westbrook is taken out of context
and extrapolated to create a contrived support for their motion and for this current appeal.
First, Westbrook claims the record shows Mr. Snuffer negotiated nearly every
sentence of the initial agreement. (See SunCrest's Brief, p. 7). This is not true. Mr. Mast
stated in his deposition he, Mr. Snuffer, and Bob Christiansen were involved in negotiating
the contract, but qualified that statement by saying Mr. Snuffer "wasn't participating in the
entire negotiations" and that he "did not author the settlement agreement language." See R.
2172.

Further, Westbrook cites the deposition of Robert Christiansen during which

Mr. Christiansen states Mr. Snuffer was involved on "our side." He does not however at any
point state Mr. Snuffer negotiated nor authored any portion of the agreement. Westbrook
states it is Mr. Christiansen's testimony that Mr. Snuffer "collaborated" with Bruce R. Baird
and Michael F. Jones on drafts of the settlement agreement. This was not what Mr.
Christiansen's testimony said. In fact, those are the words of the Defendant's attorney
taking the deposition. See 2164. To be fair, Mr. Christiansen did say Mr. Snuffer was
involved, but he further qualified that by testifying Mr. Snuffer was not at all involved in
the drafting and negotiating in Phoenix where the final agreement was reached. Id. Mr.
Christiansen's testimony refers to conversations and email exchanges between Mr. Snuffer
6

and his clients. Id. The allegations set forth by Westbrook are completely without basis or
foundation.
Westbrook alleges the agreement, was drafted in an "all night negotiating session."
(See Westbrook's Brief, p. 5). This again is not true. DJI does not deny there was at least
one occasion in which the parties met to negotiate the terms of the agreement. (R. 22222220, 2164). And, Mr. Snuffer did attend one of those sessions in his office. Id. However,
Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones, who were also in attendance, during that session, never let Mr.
Snuffer exercise any physical control over the draft document. Id. In fact, Mr. Baird and
Mr. Jones maintained the document on their disk and completed all the typing. Any
language proposed by Mr. Mast was rewritten and reworded by Mr. Baird and/or Mr. Jones
into language they agreed upon. Id. Furthermore, the agreement was substantially
completed before that session by Westbrook's attorneys, and fully and finally completed in
a three day negotiating session in Phoenix, Arizona, when Mr. Snuffer was NOT in
attendance. Id.
In fact, the final agreement was put together in Phoenix, with Bruce Baird, Ed
Grampp, David Mast and Robert Christiansen over the course of three day's worth of
meetings. See R. 2171. Westbrook contends only minor changes were made in Phoenix,
but that again is not true. The very clause which is at controversy in this matter (Paragraph
14) was negotiated then. See R. 2171-2169. The minor changes to the agreement have
been the subject of almost 5 full years of litigation, comprise 18 volumes of Court files,
which reach almost 4 feet in height. To assert the changes were minor is ridiculous given
7

the position SunCrest has taken throughout the years of litigation. In fact, the very
paragraph which has become critical to this dispute, paragraph 14, was not even included
in the initial agreement, it was only added to the actual agreement after three full days of
negotiation and presentation of assurances by Westbrook's attorneys and representatives in
Phoenix. Id. During that time Mr. Snuffer was in Salt Lake City, and did not participate in
the creation of the final documents, nor in the final execution of the agreement. Id. The
final executed documents were not even shown Mr. Snuffer until April of the year
following, six months later. Id., see also R. 2262-13; see also R. 2225-22234. ALL of the
closing documents' notary attestations are from Phoenix, where the closing took place. Id.
Although Mr. Mast and Mr. Christiansen were in Phoenix (along with Mr. Baird and Mr.
Grampp of DAE/Westbrook), Mr. Snuffer was not in Phoenix and did not attend the
closing. R. 2222-2220.
The only involvement Mr. Snuffer had with any of the negotiations or drafting of the
agreement was mere "word smithing." Id. The actual terms of the agreement were all
negotiated and determined by Plaintiffs President, Mr. Mast, and Vice-President, Mr.
Christiansen, the parties who actually had authority. Id. Mr. Snuffer's testimony will not
be helpful in this matter, and will run afoul of attorney-client privilege. Id.

3

Which is a copy of the cover letter and attachments sent in April, 2001, in which
Mr. Snuffer finally received a copy of the final documents from DAE/Westbrook.
4

Which is a copy of another delivery of the Special Warranty Deed signed at
closing, also sent in April, 2001 to Mr. Snuffer from Terrabrook.
8

Westbrook relies upon testimony of Jeff Anderson for the assertion that Mr. Snuffer
discussed the Micron easements with him. See Westbrook Brief at p. 9. The testimony of
Jeff Anderson was that he discussed that issue with Mr. Mast and Mr. Snuffer. See R. 2159.
It never states that only Mr. Snuffer discussed that matter with Mr. Anderson, in fact, when
Defendant's counsel questioned as to what Mr. Snuffer specifically discussed with him, Mr.
Anderson's answer referred to "they" or Mr. Mast and Mr. Snuffer, not Mr. Snuffer in
particular. Id. Mr. Mast was always the principle in any such conversation. Further, Mr.
Snuffer has no recollection of any such conversation. Therefore, his testimony will be he
can't recall any such discussion. Testimony of that nature does not require him to be called
as a "necessary witness" in this proceeding and is certainly no basis for disqualifying him.
Westbrook's recitation of the facts attempts to exaggerate the importance of a meeting
held in Mr. Snuffer's office one evening with Mr. Christiansen and the drafters of the
agreement. (See Appellant Brief p.6-9). At the same time, they attempt to depreciate the
four-day negotiation that took place in Phoenix, Arizona, at which Mr. Snuffer was not in
attendance. (See Appellant Brief, p. 6-9). Mr. Mast, Mr. Grampp (DAE/Westbrook) and
Mr. Baird (counsel for DAE/Westbrook) began to meet in Phoenix on Monday, November
13th. (R. 2412, 2398). Mr. Christiansen joined them on Wednesday, November 15th. The
contract closed on November 16th. R. 2222-2220, see also R. 2262-1; see also R. 22252223. On November 16th Mr. Snuffer was not only not in Phoenix on the 16thR. 2222-2220.
Therefore throughout the time when the final negotiations were taking place, Mr. Snuffer
was occupied with other matters involving other responsibilities and clients. Mr. Snuffer
9

should not be found to be a necessary witness in a case where he was not even in attendance
at the most crucial and determinate parts of the finalization of the agreement at issue.
Mr. Snuffer wrote a letter in October, 2000 asking about information about the
easement over which a road was to be built for DJI's benefit. The letter uses the term "we."
That term refers to a contact between Mr. Robert Christiansen for DJI and Micron's
representative. The letter asks for information about an easement across Micron's property.
In response, when in Phoenix, the SunCrest representatives came to Phoenix the next month
and brought with them copies of the engineered road design plans, the $8.55 million bond
guaranteeing construction of the road and the Development Agreement between SunCrest
and Draper City showing the contractual obligation to build that road adjacent to DJI's
property. Mr. Mast was satisfied with this new documentation and paragraph 14 was added
and the agreement signed. SunCrest has argued Mr. Snuffer's October, 2000 letter also was
a reason to depose him. After the Court of Appeals matter was pending, SunCrest filed
another motion to depose Mr. Snuffer just a few months ago. However, Judge Pullan
considered their arguments about the October, 2000 letter and found that it was Mr.
Christiansen, not Mr. Snuffer, who contacted Micron and therefore the deposition of Mr.
Snuffer was unnecessary. (A copy of this additional relevant ruling is attached as an exhibit
to this brief.) Further, SunCrest has been aware of this letter for over five years. There was
never any effort to depose Mr. Snuffer on the matter, and indeed no questions asked about
the letter in any timely discovery. To seek to disqualify counsel at this late date on such an
irrelevant point is unwarranted.
10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
As Defendant state, "The heart of the underlying litigation is a dispute over the
interpretation of a single paragraph in an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant."
See Appellant Brief, p. 11. In order to resolve certain disputes between these parties,
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into some negotiations. Some preliminary negotiations
took place in Mr. Snuffer's presence. After those preliminary negotiations, an initial
agreement was drafted, which did not contain the paragraph 14 referred to by defendant
as the "heart of the ... dispute." Paragraph 14 was added only after three full days of
negotiation and meetings held in Phoenix, Arizona, in which Mr. Snuffer was never
present. Mr. Snuffer cannot be a necessary witness to something he did not even
participate in.
Furthermore, Defendant's motion to disqualify was not filed "shortly" after the
Court ruled paragraph 14 should be subject to parol evidence. Rather, it was filed more
than three months after that decision came down. It was further filed more than six
months after oral arguments were heard on the motion for summary judgment in which
the issue was raised, and years after the case had been initiated. Part of the reason the
trial Court denied the motion was the untimeliness of it's presentation. The Court of
Appeals recognized this untimeliness in their affirmation.
Furthermore, it is clear that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals balanced
the interests of both sides of this dispute in making their decisions. This was done in
11

compliance with Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and the decision of
each should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

Like the Previous Motion and Appeal, This Petition is a Tactical Ploy
that Should Not be Rewarded.

In DJI's Opposition to DAE/Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify, DJI argued that
"[w]henever an opposing party attempts to disqualify the attorney for the party adverse to
him, the Court's sensitivity to a tactical ploy should be raised." See R. 2273. The same
holds true for this instance. The Rules of Professional Conduct are not intended to be used
as advocacy tools in litigation. They are intended to govern an attorney's professional
conduct. The Rules of Professional Conduct caution us in this regard and provide the
following statement in the Preamble to the Rules:
'The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as
procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's selfassessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
disciplinary authority does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of that Rule.
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty."
(Emphasis added.) Westbrook used this procedural/tactical "weapon" below in the trial
court, in the Court of Appeals, and now attempts to use it again. It is improper and
disqualification should not be granted in this case.

12

II.

The Trial Court Correctly Found and the Court of Appeals Correctly
Affirmed that Mr. Snuffer Should Not be Disqualified Pursuant to Rule
3.7 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility.

Defendant argues Mr. Snuffer and his law firm should be disqualified to act as
counsel for the Plaintiff in this matter. As support for that assertion, Defendant relies upon
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct which states:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial
hardship on the client. (Emphasis added.)
Not only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, nor likely to act as a witness in this matter,
as the trial court found and the Court of Appeals affirmed, the exceptions in this rule would
apply to Mr. Snuffer and any potential testimony he might possibly give.
"In determining whether to disqualify counsel, the trial court must recognize a
presumption in favor of [a party's] counsel of choice." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
164 (1988). Furthermore, adverse counsel should not be called as a witness to offer
insignificant testimony or as a ruse to disqualify counsel. See, e.g., State v. Worthen, 765
P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988). The drafters of the ABA Code, upon which the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct were modeled, have cautioned that the ethical rules "[were] not
designed to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and thereby disqualify him
as counsel." ABA Code, Canon 5, n. 31; accord Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d763, 766
(3d Cir. 1975). "The cost and inconvenience to clients and the judicial system from misuse
13

of the rules for tactical purposes is significant." See Brown & Brown, Disqualification of
the Testifying Advocate—A Fzrm7?w^? 57 N.C.L.Rev. 595,619-21 (1979). Because of this
potential for abuse, disqualification motions should be subjected to "particularly strict
judicial scrutiny." Optyl Eyewear Fashion v. Style Companies, 760 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir.
1985) (citing Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Freeman
v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co.y 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1982)).
Defendant's entire purpose for the original motion, and subsequent appeals is not
legitimate. Rather, they are meant to be used for tactical purposes, and to prejudice Plaintiff
in terms of time, expense, and frustration. Where the party seeking disqualification is also
the one wanting to call the attorney as a witness, the court "must be especially sensitive to
the potential for abuse." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Frazier, 637 F. Supp. 77, 86 (D.Kan.
1986).
A.

The Lower Courts Properly Balanced the Interests of Both Parties.

SunCrest's main contention in this appeal is the mistaken belief that neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals properly balanced the interests of both parties, as is required
by Rule 3.7. The belief is mistaken and the very opinions provided by those courts belies
such a claim.
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer will not be
disqualified where "[disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on
the client." Ut. R. Prof. Conduct. R. 3.7. The comment to that rule further requires a
14

balancing between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Id. Comment

At the time of the decision, Comment 4 to Rule 3.7 stated:
"4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a
balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the
opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice
depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the
lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict
with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in
determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be
given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that
one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably
be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10 has
no application to this aspect of the problem."
The balancing mentioned in the comment, relied upon by Defendant, also requires the Court
to give due regard to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client, even if there is risk
of prejudice to the opposing party. It also requires the court to consider whether or not the
party requesting the disqualification could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would
probably be a witness. Each of these balancing factors was clearly reviewed by the trial
court and incorporated into it's final decision.
To balance the interests the Court must look at whether or not the hardship that would
occur to the party whose attorney is disqualified outweighs the granting of the motion, or
vice versa. The exception to the rule is created to avoid disqualifying a party representative
when that disqualification creates too great a hardship. It does not work the other way as
suggested by Westbrook.
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The lower court found disqualifying Snuffer at this stage of the litigation would cause
substantial hardship to D.J. See Memorandum at p. 5, R. 2450. Additionally the court
found it would result in financial and tactical prejudice against D J. Id. at p. 7, R. 2448.
Those were the same issues again reviewed by the Court of Appeals. D.J. Investment
Group, LLC v. DAE/Westbrook, LLC, Case No 20040340-CA, 2005 UT App 207 (May 5,
2005), attached as Exhibit 1 to the Appendix hereto. It was this hardship that both courts
found outweighed any prejudice potentially suffered by SunCrest.
Furthermore, SunCrest cannot argue its hardships were not considered. The lower
court in its decision repeats first '"a balancing is required between the interests of the client
and those of the opposing party.'" See Memorandum Decision, p. 5 (citing Utah Rules of
Prof 1 Conduct, R. 3.7, Comment), R. 2450. Judge Davis proceeds then to state "[t]his
Court, after the weighing the [sic] interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer
at this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J." Id. The lower
court very clearly indicates not only did it recognize the requirement to weigh the interests,
but also that it had weighed the interests of both parties.
The Court of Appeals similarly recognized the requirement (see f 4) and specifically
commented that "the trial court weighed the interests of the parties!".!" D.J. Investment
Group, LLC, 2005 UT App. f 4. What Defendant perhaps wishes this Court to forget, is that
there was a hearing on this matter at the trial court level. That each side had opportunity to
present, not just by memoranda, but also in court, their arguments. As the Court can readily
see, SunCrest presented much argument supported by depositions, letters, and other
16

evidence. All of this was necessarily weighed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals, then
was asked to determine if the proper balancing had been performed. Id. The trial court
weighed the interests of both parties. That is what is reflected by the ruling by the trial court
and affirmation by the Court of Appeals. Just because SunCrest does not agree with the
Court's determination, does not mean it is wrong. It is not an abuse of discretion for the
lower court to make such a finding, nor was it an abuse of discretion for the Court of
Appeals to affirm that decision, and that finding should not be reversed now.
B.

The Court Factored All Aspects Required by the Rule, Including
Timeliness.

Rule 3.7 further requires the court factor in other aspects into their determination,
including whether or not the filing was timely. SunCrest, completely ignores the fact that
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that SunCrest's filing of the Motion
to Disqualify was untimely. Id. That, is a required factor to be considered in the balancing
required by Comment 4 of Rule 3.7, and it too, was correctly factored into the denial of the
motion.
In Zions National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah 1989),
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately
filed and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for
disqualification." This is the standard that the trial court relied upon. In that case, the filing
of a motion to disqualify three months after the discovery that the lawyer might be necessary
was too long to wait. Id. In this case, the trial court recognized that it had been three

17

months since the ruling regarding the use of parol evidence was made, but that SunCrest
reasonably should have recognized the issue even at the very initiation of the lawsuit 4 years
ago.
The trial court stated that it "must examine the entire procedural history to determine
timeliness." See R. 2448. Further, the lower court stated that "[o]ne can argue very
persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the lawsuit that the
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation
of the language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer
participated in that settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001)" Id.
at 7. The court further intimated that because of the collateral documents presented with
DJFs summary judgment memorandum in December of 2002, and the arguments made at
hearing on August 27,2003, that Westbrook should have known at that time that there might
be a potential for disqualification. See Memorandum Decision, p. 7, R. 2448. As SunCrest
acknowledges, a Motion to Disqualify should be brought at the earliest moment. Here the
lower court found that the earliest moment might have been even at the very instigation of
litigation in 2001. Or if not then, certainly by December, 2002, when DJI filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment. Or if not then, certainly by August, 2003 when oral arguments were
finally heard on DJFs Motion for Summary Judgment. Those were the reasons the court
based in making a finding of untimeliness. That was factored into the trial court's decision,
as required by Comment 4 of Rule 3.7, and it was also recognized by the Court of Appeals.
See DJ. Investment Group, LLC, 2005 UT App. 207.
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The Court of Appeals recognized that "the parties were aware that Snuffer would
likely be a necessary witness at least three months prior to filing their motion, if not earlier."
See D.J. Investment Group, LLC, 2005 UT App. f 6. In footnote, the Court of Appeals
further indicated that both parties were aware of Snuffer's participation in the settlement
agreement at the time the underlying lawsuit was filed. See Id., footnote 4. And that the
parties had even further indications at the time Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
was filed. Id.
There are issues regarding an interpretation of the agreement which have been known
since the very beginning of this litigation. If, as SunCrest now claims, Mr. Snuffer was so
intricately involved with the process of drafting the settlement documents, it was done with
SunCrest's attorneys. Mr. Snuffer's involvement, no matter what it actually was, was known
from the beginning, and this type of motion should have been brought at the beginning, as
was correctly held by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Instead, SunCrest has
waited until the matter is almost concluded and the parties are readying themselves for trial.
It is used only as a tactical ploy. At this point, trial is scheduled for January, 2006, less than
two months away. Discovery has ended. There are now more than 18 volumes of court
pleadings on file with the trial court, which reach almost 4 feet in height.

If the

disqualification of Mr. Snuffer was prejudicial a year and a half ago, when the Court
recognized the vast amount of work that had already been the prejudice that would occur if
Mr. Snuffer were disqualified at this point is exponentially greater. Although Plaintiff
disagrees that Defendant's appeal has any legal merit, even assuming arguendo that it did,
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the real effect of reversing the Court of Appeal's affirmance does nothing but amplify the
actual prejudicial burden that would be felt by DJ.

C.

Any Prejudice SunCrest Might Suffer is Minimal.

There is not one piece of evidence nor one word of testimony Mr. Snuffer could give
that would not be cumulative of the testimony that would be offered by either Mr. Mast or
Mr. Christiansen or some other witness. In every instance in which there was an oral
communication between any party with regard to the settlement agreement, Mr. Snuffer was
always accompanied by Mr. Mast or Mr. Christiansen. Further, in all communications he
was acting in conformity with instructions of Mr. Mast or Mr. Christiansen, who directed
all negotiations and who reached all agreements. Mr. Snuffer did nothing independent of
his role as an attorney for Mr. Mast's company. In all of those instances, Mr. Snuffer never
acted as a principle, nor negotiated any portion of the settlement agreement. Throughout
those negotiations, he acted as an advisor to his client making all of his communications
with them protected by the attorney client privilege and inadmissible as evidence. His ability
to testify being limited by the rules of privilege not only excludes him from acting as a
witness in this matter but also eliminates the basis for this petition.
SunCrest attempts to make hay of the extremely improbable and unrealistic scenario
of Mr. Snuffer being examined as a witness in this case. He is not a necessary witness, and
should not even be placed on the stand. A lawyer is a "necessary" witness "if his or her
testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v.
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Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297,1302 (D.Colo. 1994). In that case, the lawyer who was
ultimately disqualified, was the sole negotiator, executor, and administrator of the contract,
which made him the key witness in both situations. See World Youth at 1302. Mr. Snuffer
was not the sole negotiator, in fact as Mr. Mast testified in his deposition, his role was
relatively small in any negotiations. See Depo of Mr. Mast at p. 76, see R. 2172. Mr.
Snuffer did not draft the document, that was accomplished by Bruce Baird and Michael F.
Jones. Mr. Snuffer has not administered any portion of the agreement, in fact there was little
time to administer the agreement as Defendants almost immediately breached that
agreement. In fact, Mr. Snuffer not only did not administer the agreement, he didn't see the
final signed agreement for over six months after it was finalized. Mr. Snuffer was not as
involved as Defendants claim. To observe the negotiations and review drafts does not make
him a necessary witness. American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 634 F.
Supp. 112,122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Similarly, a lawyer who merely observed the negotiations
and reviewed draft agreements need not be disqualified."). See also Paretti v. Cavalier
Label Co., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 985, 986 (S.D.N.Y, 1989) (The court found in Paretti that the
attorney was not a necessary witness as his recollection of the meeting did not conflict with
that of movant's corporate counsel; as his involvement in drawing up early drafts of
agreements was not important because they were redrafted; as it was not shown any of the
key terms were actually written by that attorney and, therefore, reflect his understanding of
the transaction; and as to any ambiguous terms the testimony of the parties concerning their
intent was the best evidence). In this case, the very "heart" of this litigation, by SunCrest's
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denomination, is a paragraph that was not included in any agreement Mr. Snuffer ever had
any part in.
Moreover, any testimony Mr. Snuffer could offer is obtainable from various other
sources including Mr. Mast, Mr. Christiansen, Mr. Baird, Mr. Jones, Mr. Anderson, Mr.
Grampp, and a variety of other persons who were directly involved in the creation of the
settlement agreement, and even more specifically, the very paragraph 14 that has become
central to this litigation. Most of these other individuals were in attendance at the three day
meeting in Phoenix where the terms of the agreement were actually finalized and agreed
upon. Mr. Snuffer was not at that final meeting. The fact that he communicated to his client
by phone, email, or even fax, does not make him a witness. "[I]f the evidence sought to be
elicited from the attorney-witness can be produced in some other effective way, it may be
that the attorney is not necessary as a witness." Humphrey on behalf of State v. McLaren,
402 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn. 1987). "If the lawyer's testimony is merely cumulative, or
quite peripheral. .. ordinarily the lawyer is not a necessary witness." Id. "Simply to assert
that the attorney will be called as a witness, a too-frequent trial tactic, is not enough." Id.
In the cited testimony of Mr. Christiansen (on page 34 of the Christiansen deposition
transcript, R. 2162) Mr. Christiansen declined to make Mr. Snuffer a party to paragraph 14
discussions. He testified it was he (Mr. Christiansen) who satisfied himself, through
discussions with Mr. Baird representing DAE/Westbrook paragraph 14 granted access to the
Alpine Highway. He testified that this understanding was "critical" to bringing the property
into development. Nothing is said about Mr. Snuffer's involvement with that discussion.
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Although Mr. Baird as counsel for DAE/Westbrook interjected himself into the
negotiation process in a way to make him a necessary witness (as Defendants have
acknowledged), Mr. Snuffer did not. Mr. Baird was the lead negotiator and had sole
involvement at times. Mr. Snuffer was neither the lead negotiator nor was there any time
when he was the sole party involved. Defendants have argued that Mr. Baird is a necessary
witness5, which Plaintiff has not disputed. However, Plaintiffs have always maintained, and
now two courts have agreed, that Mr. Snuffer is not similarly situated and his involvement
was tangential to the process.
In essence, Mr. Snuffer's testimony is unnecessary. Furthermore, it cannot go to the
issues which are at the very "heart" of this dispute. It cannot disadvantage SunCrest. This
was appropriately weighed by the trial court, and examined by the Court of Appeals. Those
courts did not fail to consider the burdens that SunCrest might potentially face, rather it
carefully weighed those in contrast with the actual burdens DJ will face, in addition to the
timeliness of the motion and the other factors the court relied upon.
D.

There Will Be No Burden on the Tribunal.

Defendant argues that the tribunal will be burdened by Mr. Snuffer acting as a
witness. First, that is not a factor required to be considered in the balancing requirement of
Comment 4, as it read at the time of the Motion. Though that has now been amended in the
5

Despite this, Mr. Baird has refused to produce documents and resisted discovery aimed
at him. Motions to compel and for protective orders have been necessary and continue to be
argued below, and still nothing has been produced from Mr. Baird. So it seems that his status as
"necessary witness" may be a convenient tactical argument for purposes of attempting to
disqualify Mr. Snuffer rather than a real acknowledgment which Defendants intend to act upon.
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current version of the comment, it was not a part of the version a year and a half ago when
the motion was filed, and should not be considered at this time.
Secondly, the Court should recognize that there has been a substantial amount of
discovery accomplished in this case. There are at least 20 witnesses that will participate in
the trial of this matter. Mr. Snuffer, even if he actually is called to be one of those witnesses,
cannot be a significant one. The suggestion that Mr. Snuffer will have to "hop off the stand
for each question posed on behalf of his client" or "to object from the witness box, or step
down and do this" is a silly proposition and devalues the time, effort, and import of the
issues before this Court or before the trial court on that very matter.
SunCrest lastly recognizes the significant hardship that would occur Plaintiff if the
Defendant's motion was granted today. It argues that in contrast, the hardship must have
been lesser at the time Defendant's motion was actually granted. While that may be true,
that does not reduce, or even speak to the gravity of the burden that would have been
suffered at the time of the trial court's decision. That the hardship on Plaintiff would be
greater at this point than it would have been only 3 years into the litigation is a moot point.
The trial court decidedly weighed the burden disqualification would have on DJ, stating that
at that time, disqualification would require DJ to expend an exorbitant amount of time and
money. See Rec. 2449. That the hardship would be greater now should not give this Court
pause to believe that the decisions made by the trial court or the Court of Appeals were
wrong. They were not, and they should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests this Court affirm the
decisions of the Fourth District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals not to disqualify
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. from continuing as counsel for Plaintiff and Appellee in this case.

DATED this
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day of November, 2005.
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APPENDIX
1.

D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. DAEAVestbrook, LLC, Case No 20040340CA, 2005 UT App. 207 (May 5, 2005).

2.

Ruling on DAEAVestbrook L.L.C.'s Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer,
Jr. And Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C., Decision by Judge Lynn W.
Davis of the Fourth Judicial District Court, entered June 9, 2004.
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
1l
Appellant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. (Westbrook)1 argues that the
trial court erred by denying its Motion to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer Jr. and the law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen,
P.C. (collectively Snuffer). We affirm.
^2
On November 16, 2000, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement, which dismissed D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C.'s (D.J.)
lawsuit against Westbrook. Snuffer, attorney for D.J., was
involved in the negotiations leading to the settlement agreement.
On May 7, 2001, D.J. rescinded the settlement agreement and filed
suit against Westbrook. Nearly three years later, Westbrook
filed a Motion to Disqualify Snuffer, relying primarily on Utah

1. Since filing its Motion to Disqualify, Westbrook has changed
its name to SunCrest, L.L.C.

EXHIBIT

Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. The trial court denied the
Motion to Disqualify, and Westbrook subsequently filed this
interlocutory appeal .
^3
The standard of review generally for decisions relating to
disqualification is abuse of discretion, unless the court is
called upon to resolve solely a legal or ethical issue. See
Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998)
(holding that because no issues of fact were presented to the
trial court, "to the extent this [c]ourt has a special interest
in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a
trial court's discretion is limited"). In contrast, "[w]here
courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual disputes, and
the quantity of less tangible factors implicating the trial
court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better
position to consider and weigh all those circumstances in their
application to the legal standard at issue." Id. (citing State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). The trial court's
ruling incorporates both questions of fact and law, and thus we
apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Margulies v.
Unchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1995) (where the trial
court's findings involve "mixed questions of fact and law . . . .
the proper standard of review . . . is the abuse of discretion
standard").
^4
Westbrook argues that the trial court erred by finding that
Snuffer's disqualification would work substantial hardship on
D.J. and by not balancing the interests of the parties.2
According to rule 3.7, "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness
except where . . . [d]isqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client." Utah R. Prof.'1 Conduct
3.7(a) (emphasis added). In determining whether an attorney
should be disqualified on the grounds contemplated by rule 3.7,
the trial court is required to balance the client's interests
with those of the opposing party. See Utah R. Proff1 Conduct 3.7

2. Westbrook also argues that the trial court erred by failing
to determine whether Snuffer was a necessary witness. However,
it was not essential that the trial court determine whether
Snuffer was a "necessary witness" under rule 3.7 of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct because, even if it had, the
hardship exception would have compelled the same result:
Snuffer's disqualification would force undue hardship upon D.J.

cmt. However, even if there is risk of prejudice to the opposing
party, "due regard must be given to the effect of
disqualification on the lawyer's client." Id. (emphasis added). 3
^5
Here, the trial court weighed the interests of the parties
and found that D.J. would face substantial hardship in both time
and money if forced to hire new counsel at such a late stage of
discovery. Specifically, the court noted that
[t]he case at bar was filed in May of 2001,
almost three years ago, and since that time
the parties have vigorously litigated an
extraordinary number of legal issues. The
[c]ourt also notes that the parties have
conducted a significant amount of discovery
in connection with this litigation. Most, if
not all, of the key witnesses have been
deposed and written discovery has been sent
out and answered by both parties. All things
considered, the parties have engaged in a
substantial amount of work. Indeed, the
[c]ourt file now fills seven exceptionally
thick folders and addresses some very complex
legal issues. The [c]lerk of the [c]ourt has
just opened the eighth file. Under these
circumstances, the [c]ourt doubts another
attorney could be brought up to speed in this
matter and recognizes that such an effort
would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant
amount of time and money.

3. When issues of professional discretion arise, the Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct call for self-governance. In particular,
the rules state,
Violation of a [r]ule should not give rise to
a cause of action, nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. The [r]ules are designed to
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed
to be a basis for civil liability.
Furthermore, the purpose of the [r]ules can
be subverted when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons.
Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct Scope.

^[6
The trial court also found that Westbrook filed its motion
in an untimely manner. We agree. A motion to disqualify counsel
is untimely when it is not "immediately filed and diligently
pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for
disqualification." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Barbara Jensen
Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(emphasis added) (holding that the defendants' motion to
disqualify counsel was untimely because it was filed three months
after it learned of the representation, and one day before the
opponent's motion to compel settlement was scheduled for
hearing). Here the parties were aware that Snuffer would likely
be a necessary witness at least three months prior to filing
their motion, if not earlier.4 Thus, had Westbrook timely filed
its motion, it could have significantly reduced D.J.'s costs of
retaining and bringing new counsel up to speed.
^[7
Because D.J. would face substantial hardship if forced to
retain new counsel at this late stage and Westbrook's motion to
disqualify Snuffer was untimely, we hold that the trial court
properly denied Westbrook's motion. Accordingly, we affirm.

Gu*&^ m. lll&^/)
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
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WE CONCUR:

)&Xh>&£#<&^
Russell W. Be
Associate

G^-^ory K. Orme, Judge

4. At the time the underlying lawsuit was filed, both parties
were aware of Snuffer's participation in the settlement
agreement. Likewise, the parties were aware of Snuffer's
participation from the arguments presented for and against D.J.rs
Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, even if Westbrook did not
believe that Snuffer was a necessary witness until the trial
court indicated parole evidence would be taken in regard to the
settlement agreement, Westbrook failed to file its Motion to
Discaialifv until three months later.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 5th day of May, 2005, a true and
correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the United
States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be
delivered to:
DENVER C SNUFFER JR
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 S STATE ST
SANDY UT 84070-4104
RICHARD W. CASEY
STEVEN G. CROCKETT
EVELYN J FURSE
BENDINGER CROCKETT PETERSON GREENWO
170 S MAIN STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
ATTN: TERI ANDERSON
12 5 N 100 W
PROVO UT 84 603

Judicial Secretary
TRIAL COURT: FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, 010402305
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20040340-CA

0"/' ' "

"»ah• Cou,

wsindjtCourt
Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

D.J. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C., a Delaware limited,
liability company; DRAPER CITY, a municipal
corporation; JOHN DOES 1 to 15,

RULING ON DAE/WESTBROOK L.L.C'S
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DENVER C.
SNUFFER, JR. AND NELSON SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Civil No. 010402305
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer
Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen. Oral arguments were held on April 7,2004. Richard
Casey appeared on behalf of DAE/Westbrook ("Westbrook") and Denver Snuffer appeared on
behalf of D.J. Investment Group ("D.J."). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully
considered the Motions and Memoranda of the Parties now makes the following ruling.

I.
FACTUAL SUMMARY & RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. In October 2000 Westbrook entered D.J.'s property and began building a roadway in order to
conform with city regulations that required communities of 20+ dwellings to have more than one
road leading to and from the community.
2. D.J. filed a lawsuit in the 4th District Court to abate what it considered to be a trespass on the
part of Westbrook and also sued for damages.
3. On November 16, 2000 in Phoenix, Arizona, the parties created a multifaceted agreement
containing, among other things, provisions dismissing D.J.'s lawsuit and allowing Westbrook to
continue using the access road on D.J.'s property. Denver Snuffer ("Snuffer"), D.J.'s attorney,
participated, either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation the agreement.
4. Provision 14 of the agreement allowed D.J. the use of a not-yet-created "Southerly Roadway"
that would be located on Micron property abutting D.J.'s property. The original route
contemplated would give D.J. access to State Road 92 by way of this "Southerly Road."
5. Despite Westbrook's representations that it had secured the necessary easements to construct
the Southerly Roadway, the rights to these easements may not have been obtained and Westbrook
is now preparing to build the Southerly Highway along a different route that does not provide D.J.
with any access to State Road 92. On May 7, 2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of the
settlement agreement and began this current litigation.
6. On June 8, 2001, Westbrook filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint.
7. On December 20, 2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
8. Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2003.
9. D.J. filed its Reply to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on
February 5,2003.
10. On August 7, 2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
11. On August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
12. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
August 27, 2003. Richard Casey appeared on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared
on behalf of D.J. At the conclusion of Oral Arguments the Court took the matter under
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advisement.
13. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the November 16, 2000
settlement agreement. The corresponding Order denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was signed and filed on January 7, 2004.
14. On February 19, 2004, Westbrook filed a Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
15. On February 25, 2004, D.J. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
16. After being granted additional time to respond to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C, Westbrook filed its
Reply to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on March 17, 2004.
17. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on April 7, 2004. Richard Casey appeared
on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared on behalf of D.J.
18. Denver Snuffer has served as D.J.'s counsel in the case at bar from the inception of the
original litigation to the present time.
II.
ANALYSIS

Westbrook contends this Court should disqualify Snuffer in the case at bar because
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this litigation violates Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. D.J. argues this Court should not disqualify Snuffer because Snuffer is not
a necessary witness in the case at bar and disqualifying Snuffer at this point in the litigation would
inflict substantial hardship on D.J. Although Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in the case
at bar may implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court declines to
disqualify Snuffer because Westbrook's request is untimely and would inflict significant hardship
on D.J.
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A.

SNUFFER'S ACTIONS IN THE CASE AT BAR IMPLICATE RULE 3.7

Westbrook alleges that Snuffer's representation of D.J. in the case at bar violates Rule 3.7
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the
client.
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 3.7. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the prohibition

against serving as counsel and witness and indicated that M[i]f an attorney attempts to combine the
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both as
advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard,
707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985). The Leonard Court also indicated that "application of this rule
does not depend on whether an attorney will be called but. .. on whether he 'ought to be called as
a witness' in the underlying action." Id.
D.J. notes that Rule 3.7 only applies when an attorney is a necessary witness during the
trial. Snuffer, D.J. contends, is not a necessary witness and therefore should not be disqualified. A
lawyer is generally only considered a necessary witness "if his or her testimony is relevant, material
and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1302
(D. Colo. 1994). Furthermore, Utah courts have indicated that disqualification of a lawyer may
not be necessary if his or her testimony only relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues. Leonard,
707 P.2d at 653.
The factual disputes between the parties make it difficult for the Court to make a
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conclusive determination as to whether Snuffer was sufficiently involved in the settlement
negotiations to warrant his designation as a "necessary'" witness in the case at bar. Although
Westbrook and D.J. provide very different renditions of Snuffer's role in the negotiations leading
up to the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement, both accounts demonstrate that Snuffer was
present during many of the negotiation sessions and advised David Mast and Robert Christensen
on matters related to such settlement negotiations. While Snuffer's involvement may have
rendered him a "necessary" witness in the case at bar, this Court holds that it does not need to
reach such a determination because the facts of this litigation give rise to the "special
circumstances" exception contemplated in Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
B.

DISQUALIFYING SNUFFER WOULD "WORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP" ON D.J.

Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct will not prevent a lawyer from
advocating at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness if "[djisqualification of
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.7. In order to determine whether a client will suffer a "substantial hardship," "a balancing is
required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." UTAH RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R.

3.7, Comment.

This Court, after the weighing the interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer at
this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J. The case at bar was filed in
May of 2001, almost three years ago, and since that time the parties have vigorously litigated an
extraordinary number of legal issues. The Court also notes that the parties have conducted a
significant amount of discovery in connection with this litigation. Most, if not all, of the key
witnesses have been deposed and written discovery has been sent out and answered by both
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parties. All things considered, the parties have engaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed,
the Court file now fills seven exceptionally thick folders and addresses some very complex legal
issues. The Clerk of the Court has just opened the eighth file. Under these circumstances, the
Court doubts another attorney could be brought up to speed in this matter and recognizes that
such an effort would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant amount of time and money.
Furthermore, this Court believes that Westbrook could have significantly reduced the costs
of bringing new counsel up to speed if Westbrook had filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver
Snuffer in a more timely fashion. In Zion 's First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc.,
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately filed
and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification."
In Jensen,iht Utah Court of Appeals held that Jensen's Motion to Disqualify Counsel was
untimely because it was filed more than seven months after counsel's first appearance and more
than three months after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict. In contrast to Jensen,
Westbrook's own pleadings intimate that Westbrook has "reasonably foreseen," since the initiation
of this litigation, that Snuffer might be called as a witness in the case at bar.
Westbrook argues that Snuffer only became a "necessary" witness in this litigation at the
time the Court indicated that it would accept parole evidence regarding the settlement agreement.
Even if Westbrook's argument is accepted as true this Court can still find Westbrook's filing was
untimely. Westbrook filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer on February 19, 2004, roughly
three months after the Court's November 17, 2003 decision to accept parole evidence on the
settlement agreement at issue. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals held Jensen's Motion to
Disqualify Counsel was untimely because it was filed "more than three months" after Jensen
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became aware of the potential conflict." Jensen 781 P.2d at 481. Similarly, this Court could find
that Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer was untimely because it was filed more
than three months after Westbrook became aware of the Court's decision to accept parole
evidence regarding the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement.
But the Court must examine the entire procedural history to determine timeliness. One can
argue very persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the lawsuit that the
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation of the
language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer participated in that
settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001)
More importantly at the time of the filing of Summary Judgment/Partial Summary
Judgment, defendants were placed on notice that plaintiffs intended to rely on a variety of
collateral documents (renderings, blueprints, bonds, etc.) to show the alignment of the subject
road. (Date: December 20, 2002). If that were not enough, at oral argument on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, this position became abundantly clear. (Date: August 27, 2003).
Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer from the case at bar would result in significant
financial and tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light of Westbrook's untimely filing of its Motion to
Disqualify, this Court rejects Westbrook's motion and declines to disqualify Denver Snuffer from
this litigation.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. Plaintiffs counsel is
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instructed to prepare an order consistent with the findings contained herein.

DATED this f "

day of April, 2004.
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